Introduction
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) continues to face health related challenges in the context of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, heart disease, cancer, hepatitis and a host of other ailments. Although regional cooperation has seen the HIV/AIDS infection rate on the decline, the disease burden in other areas, especially in tuberculosis and life-style diseases such as heart disease, is not on the decline. 1
The SADC region depends largely on imported patented medicines to deal with the burgeoning disease burden, but the medicines are expensive. Although some SADC members such as South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have limited pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, the volumes of locally produced drugs are inadequate to deal with the disease burden. As members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), SADC members can take advantage of the flexibilities introduced by the Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and override patent rights in some specified instances in order to access affordable essential medicines.
One of the TRIPS flexibilities is the leeway given to WTO members to decide within the confines of their national laws and contexts what amounts to patentable subject matter and to exclude certain inventions, such as diagnostics, methods of treating the human or animal body, and new uses of existing patents from registration as patents. 15 According to the report cited, during the 12 year period only 15 per cent of the medicines were highly innovative drugs. 16 The logical conclusion which may be drawn from the study, therefore, is that the bulk of new medicines are modified versions of older drugs, which ironically cost more than the original ones on which they are based.
On a related note, India has raised the criteria for patentability so as to prevent evergreen patents from being registered. 17 In the specific Indian context, applicants are made to establish to a high degree of certainty that the medication for which an application for a patent has been made is more effective than (emphasis added) those medications already used for the same condition. 18 In India the relevant law 19 allows members of the public to bring to the attention of the patent controller evidence which may lead to patent rejection. 20 20 Adusei 2011 JWIP 12. 21 Adusei 2011 JWIP 12.
L NDLOVU PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 787 It is submitted that the case discussed below demonstrates that at least in the Indian context, having higher patentability requirements in order to prevent weak or evergreen patents does have positive results for access to medicines. The crux of the matter was whether or not the appellant was entitled to a patent for the beta crystalline form of the compound Imatinib Mesylate, which is a therapeutic drug for chronic myeloid leukaemia and certain kinds of tumours and is marketed under the name "Glivec" or "Gleevec". 26
The Pertinent Facts and other Background Information
The drug Glivec, manufactured by Novartis Pharmaceuticals, was originally invented by Jurg Zimmerman, a medicinal chemist, who invented a number of derivatives of N- The basis for Novartis' patent application for the beta crystalline form of Imatinib in India was an alleged inventive step that materialised when a two-stage invention process involving the introduction of a specified amount of beta crystals into the base form of Imatinib was embarked upon. 35 Very specifically, the claims in the patent application alleged the following about the Beta crystalline form of Imatinib:
(a) it had more beneficial flow properties; 36 (b) it had better thermodynamic stability; 37 and (c) it had lower hydroscopicity than the alpha crystalline form of Imatinib. 38 It was alleged that these properties made the beta crystalline form of Imatinib "new"
and superior due to its ability to store better, be processed more easily, and its having 28 Novartis case para 5. 29 Novartis case para 5. 30 The patent was granted under US Patent Number 5 Novartis then appealed the decision of the IPAB to the Supreme Court of India, which was initially reluctant to hear the appeal but was swayed by the public interest in the matter 50 and the delays that had accompanied the finalisation of the matter. Judgment was delivered on 1 April 2013.
The Supreme Court judgment
Before delivering its judgment, the Supreme Court of India per Aftab Alam J reduced the issues at stake in the case to an enquiry into the true import of section 3(d) of the Act and how it interplays with clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1) of the Act. 51 The key question to answer in the opinion of the Court was "does the product which Novartis claims as a patent qualify as a new product?" 52 As a corollary to the question, it was crucial to enquire into whether the product in question had a characteristic feature that involves a technical advance over existing knowledge that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art (emphasis added). 53 Clauses (j) and (ja) had deleted section 5 of the previous Patents Act, which prohibited product patents in India, and at the same time, amendments were effected to section 3, introducing section 3(d). 55 The Court expressed the opinion that in order to understand the purport and objects of the amendments it was important to identify the mischief parliament wanted to check. 56 The object which section 3(d) sought to achieve was to prevent evergreening, provide easy access to life-saving drugs to citizens, and realise the constitutional obligation to provide good health care to citizens. 57
After a detailed exposition of India's legislative history 58 relating to intellectual property generally and patents in particular, the Supreme Court concluded that the law had been passed in order to protect India's policy space to afford good health to its citizens while complying with the basic prescripts of the TRIPS Agreement. 59 The Court believed that the patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products might have the effect of putting life-saving medicines beyond the reach of a very large section of the population, 60 and that the amendments were therefore justified.
The Court clarified the pertinent legal provisions as follows: 61 inventive step, 62 and be capable of being made or used in an industry. 63 The requirement that an invention must involve an inventive step implies that there must be a feature that involves a technical advance as compared to existing knowledge or having economic significance or both. 64 Further, this feature should be such that the invention is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. 65
With specific reference to section 3(d), the Court first of all observed that section three
provides for "what are not inventions".
Under section 3(d), the following are not inventions within the meaning of the Act: S 2(1)(j)(i)-(iii) of the Patents Act. 63 S 2(1)(ac) of the Patents Act. 64 Novartis case para 89. 65 Novartis case para 89. 66 Novartis case para 95. 67 The full text of the old s 3(d) is hereby reproduced verbatim for information as follows: "(d) the mere discovery of any new property or mere new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant". 68 Novartis case para 96. 69 The explanatory clause to s 3(d) provides that "salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known substances shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy". targets specific fields of technology (pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals)since nothing had ever arisen in the context of the section in other fields of invention. 71
It was submitted on behalf of Novartis that section 3(d) was not an exception to patentability. Hence, once a substance satisfies the requirements in section 2(1)(j) and (ja), it satisfies the requirements of patentability. Consequently, section 3(d) did not apply to the Novartis case. 72 This submission was made notwithstanding the concession by counsel for Novartis that the aim of section 3(d) was to prevent trifling change and evergreening while allowing and encouraging incremental patenting. 73
With specific reference to public health and the use of TRIPS flexibilities, Novartis argued that the best route was to make use of compulsory licences, 74 revocation proceedings 75 and multiple stages of patent opposition procedures 76 rather than to make use of section 3(d). 77
The Supreme Court dismissed the above submissions on a number of grounds. 78
Firstly, the Court held that section 3(d) is not a provision ex majorie cautela (out of abundant caution), as was submitted on behalf of Novartis, when taking into account the totality of the historical development that led to the enactment of the provision. 79
Secondly, the Court cautioned that the relevant provision was enacted to deal with chemical patents and pharmaceuticals by setting additional qualifications for the patentability of such products. 80 Thirdly, and very importantly, the Court clarified the position by stating that the door was wide open for true inventions but closed by 71 Novartis case para 97-98. There is a likelihood that s 3(d) may be impugned at the WTO dispute settlement level on the ground that it is discriminatory in terms of targeting patents in specific fields of technology contrary to the TRIPS Agreement, which provides in A 27.1 that patents shall be available in all fields of technology, and that patent rights must be enjoyable "without discrimination" as to "the field of technology". However, see for a counter argument Lewis- Therefore, the specific product did not satisfy the test of an "invention" as laid down in section 2(1)(j) and (ja) of the Patents Act. 86 With specific reference to the beta crystalline form of Imatinib, it was submitted on behalf of Novartis that section 3(d) applies if a substance is a new form of a known product having known efficacy, and that "known" in the specific context meant proven and well established while "known efficacy" meant "efficacy established empirically and proven beyond doubt". 87 Mesylate, with well-known efficacy. 90 Therefore, the fact that the beta form of Imatinib was a product that claimed to enhance the form of its old counterpart triggered the application of section 3(d). 91
Very specifically, the Court observed that in its application for a patent, Novartis averred that all the therapeutic qualities of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate were also possessed by Imatinib in a free base form. This, therefore, raised the question of whether an enhanced efficacy over a known substance as demanded by section 3(d) existed. 92 The Court held that the correct "efficacy" to consider in section 3(d) is "therapeutic efficacy" in the specific context of medicines. 93 The Court further noted that the test for enhanced therapeutic efficacy must be applied strictly. 94
The Court, therefore, concluded that the physico-chemical properties of beta correctly that the import of its judgment was not to outlaw incremental inventions of chemical and pharmaceutical patents, but that only those chemical and pharmaceutical inventions that did not lead to the enhancement of therapeutic efficacy were barred by the judgment. 101 This clarification is welcome for jurisprudential certainty and puts Indian patent law on the subject in a positive light.
As anticipated, the decision was warmly welcomed by access to medicines activists and patient organisations in India and beyond. Given India's key role in the global supply of affordable medicines, both patented and generic, there is no gainsaying that the decision has worldwide implications, 102 including in the SADC.
An evaluation of the case and lessons for the SADC
From the above narration of facts and the outline of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, it is important to emphasise what the court said and did not say. 103
The court did not say that a new form of a known compound could not be patented;
neither did it say that improving bioavailability characteristics of a drug may not result in enhanced efficacy. 104 For the SADC, the manner in which the Indian Supreme Court dealt with the application of section 3(d) in the specific context should be encouraging. SADC members should be emboldened by this decision and embark on IP law reform that takes into account each member's social and economic needs. This is a general assumption based on the apparently widely accepted view that evergreening is bad and effects developing countries negatively. As previously said, section 3(d) is TRIPSplus, but it does not follow that TRIPS-plus IP legislative provisions are South Africa has taken the lead and has boldly stated in its Draft IP Policy that it will not tolerate incremental patenting and a proliferation of evergreen patents. 108
Despite the decision in Novartis having been characterised in colourful terms by other writers and critics, 109 this writer believes that the decision is relevant to the context obtaining in the SADC for the reasons outlined below.
Although the rejection of Novartis' claims was met with criticism from the pharmaceutical industry as shifting the balance too much in favour of the protection of public health, 110 the fact that the decision gave prominence to public health issues over IP must be celebrated as relevant to the current SADC situation in which law reform is still possible. In the judgment itself, in the course of describing the history of IP law in India the Supreme Court said that the Committee under the chairmanship of Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar "took a fresh look at the law of patents to completely revamp and recast it to best subserve the (contemporary) needs of the country". 111
One of the observations of the Committee, which I don't entirely agree with, was that patent systems are not created in order to satisfy the interests of the inventor but rather to take care of the interests of the economy. 112 107 Abbott 2013 Intellectual Property Watch 3 submits that there is nothing wrong with the strict Indian standard and a similar approach was followed by the US Patent Office until the decision in This observation rings very true in the SADC region, which is urged to revamp its patent laws by taking advantage of TRIPS flexibilities in the context of regional priorities. Indeed, the rejection of Novartis' application was regarded by some health activists as a victory for public health. 113 The debate over the patentability of pharmaceuticals has been intense and in the majority of instances emotionally charged, when the right to patent exclusivity is pitted against the right to public health. 114 The Supreme Court of India displayed sensitivity to the potential conflict, for both social and economic reasons. 115 The Court did, in actual fact, show that it was aware of the conflict when it clearly recognised that the current IP system seeks to promote both innovation and social economic welfare in India, thus making the benefits of the patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices to the public. 116 The decision in Novartis relating to the interpretation of section 3(d) was well reasoned, since similar decisions have been handed down in other parts of the developed world in similar contexts. 117 The case is however important because it deals with the subject in the context of a less powerful WTO member, India, and this will in all likelihood inspire and embolden other developing countries. The similar decisions referred to in this paragraph and the subsequent references to case law in footnote 118 below are related to developed rather than developing countries.
The main aim of section 3(d), as previously explained, is to prevent evergreening and avoid the issuing of patents that are of a low quality and add only insignificant 113 't Hoen 2013 J Public Health Policy 370. 114 Barazza 2013 JIPLP 786. 115 Barazza 2013 JIPLP 786. 116 Barazza 2013 JIPLP 786. 117 Barazza 2013 JIPLP 786-787. The pertinent cited cases are Pfizer Inc v Apotex Inc [2007] improvements to the state of the art. 118 The concern about evergreen patents is not unique to India. 119 It is also important to note that the patent which Novartis sought to register in India was initially rejected by the US patent authorities for lack of novelty and granted only on appeal in May 2005. 120 Evergreening is compounded by weak patent examination systems and chokes technological progress. 121 Some SADC member states do not provide for a patent examination system, hence evergreening is likely to proliferate in such situations. 122 The problem is well illustrated in South Africa. According to the Treatment Action When pharmaceutical companies seek to maximise profits by patenting incrementally despite the obvious lack of novelty and inventive step, such behaviour, as was the case with Novartis in this instance, may fairly be characterised as patent abuse aimed at registering patents over minor insignificant changes in order to extend monopolistic prices. 125 It is submitted that in addition to having robust legislative provisions along similar lines to India's section 3(d), SADC members may react to such forms of abuse through the deployment of compulsory licenses in the event of an abuse of patent rights, as ably provided for in most IP legislations of the member states. 126 The Novartis judgment delivers the message that the problem of low quality patents In concluding the discussion of the lessons to be learnt by the SADC from the Novartis case, it is important to refer to the role that was played by civil society groups to highlight the high stakes and importance of access to medicines. It has been reported that the outcome of the case is consistent with the pattern in the 1990s of a de facto coalition between health advocates, NGOs and some governments, including India, which are desirous of limiting the impact of IP on access to medicines. 140 It needs to be recalled that various advocacy groups, such as Médecins Sans Frontiers, Health Gap in the US, the Delhi Network of Positive People and the Swiss-based Berne Declaration took part in lobbying against the Novartis case. 141 In addition, leading up to the Novartis AGM demonstrations were held in a number of US cities such as Boston, New York and Washington, while in India more demonstrations were held as a way of drawing attention to the Novartis case. 142 The role of civil society in promoting access to medicines is clear and need not be laboured here, save to say that apart from South Africa, most SADC countries have limited civil society activity, or like in Zimbabwe, they selectively criminalise civil society activities. 143 In the Novartis case, there was a coalition of civil society groups from within India and beyond. The success of such a coalition should be an informative lesson for the SADC in the context of regional IP reform to improve access to medicines.
The Novartis case is therefore important because it clearly shows that with a government that is sensitive to the peculiar public health needs of its people, it is possible to take full advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities with the aid of an independent judiciary and a robust civil society that works well with its global counterparts. The decision scored a victory for the generic industry in India by arresting incremental patenting and evergreening. The victory was achieved through the deployment of patentability provisions and opposition procedures in the Indian Patents Act. For example, in 2011 it was reported by the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law 2012 IJNL 20 that Zimbabwean police raided an academic meeting and arrested all civil society activists present for watching a video on the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The activists were charged with treason or attempting to overthrow the government by unconstitutional means.
Recommendations
Going slightly beyond the facts of the case and the sources consulted, the recommendations outlined below illustrate how the lessons highlighted above may be practically implemented in select SADC countries. The recommendations relate to new use patents, strengthening patent abuse provisions in order to curb evergreening, strengthening patentability requirements for medicines and related substances, and introducing patent searches and examinations in order to ensure that patents rejected in other jurisdictions are not registered in the SADC region.
New use patents
The Indian case discussed above was primarily a complaint about Novartis' attempt to register a patent in India for a drug that was already state of the art and therefore The Zambian Patents Act, last amended in 1987, generally does not exclude new uses except in cases where the invention is capable of being used as food or medicine in a prohibitory context similar to that provided for in Malawian law (see s 18(1)(c) of the Zambian Patents Act).
148
In terms of A 27 of TRIPS, patents shall be available for inventions of products and processes in all fields of technology as long as the inventions are new, involve an inventive step and are capable
Strengthening patent law provisions to curb evergreening
The drug in dispute in the Indian case, Imatinib Mesylate, was patented in South Africa with no litigation ensuing. 149 The most likely reason why this drug and its new use variants have been patented in South Africa since 1993 is the fact that South African patent law does not provide for mandatory patent searches and examinations. 150 In the SADC region, Botswana's Industrial Property Act of 2010 may be regarded as model legislation for patent examinations. 157 The relevant law provides for an examination of the subject of a patent application in order ascertain if it complies with the requirements of the Act, 158 and also grants the Minister responsible for patents the discretion to designate certain patent applications as exempt from an examination covering the requirements for novelty and inventiveness. 159 Although Botswana's law in this specific context could have been drafted better, it is a good example of taking a deliberate step that will limit the abuse of the patent system and curb evergreening.
It is therefore recommended that SADC members include patent examination provisions in their laws in order to ensure that only deserving patents are granted.
Patentability requirements for medicines and related substances
Historically, there was an initial reluctance to allow patents on pharmaceutical products in many jurisdictions. 160 The French Patent Act of July 5, 1844 on patents 161 (Loi du 5 juillet 1844 sur les brevets d'invention), for example, excluded from protection "[L]es compositions pharmaceutiques ou remedes de toute espece", (my emphasis) that is, pharmaceutical compositions or medicines of all kinds. 162 The Act banned patents on pharmaceutical products and their pharmaceutical composition but not the process of fabrication of a pharmaceutical substance. 163 The ban remained until 1959, when an ordinance was passed providing that patents would be granted for pharmaceutical products, with a possibility of issuing compulsory licences in the case of insufficient quantities and abnormally high prices. 164
All SADC members have provisions in their laws allowing for the granting of pharmaceutical patents. 165 In addition, more than 50 per cent of the SADC members are least developed countries (LDCs), which are not obliged in terms of the WTO TRIPS Agreement to enforce patents. 166 27, 1994 , November 27, 1998 , November 24, 2000 , November 21, 2003 , November 24, 2006 , November 30, 2011 and November 25, 2013 One of the most important lessons for SADC members is that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent them from denying the patentability of new uses of drugs for lack of novelty, the involvement of an inventive step and the lack of industrial applicability.
Developing countries and SADC member states would be within their rights if they excluded new uses of known products including diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods from patentability in order to protect their citizens' right to health and by extension, their access to medicines.
171
Article 66 of TRIPS mandates developed WTO members to provide, upon request, financial and technical cooperation to their developing and least developed counterparts on mutually agreed terms and conditions. Such cooperation includes assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights. 
